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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The issues presented on appeal are as follows: 
1. Whether an Administrative Law Judge must follow 
the rules and regulations promulgated by the Industrial 
Commission regarding the referral of cases to a medical panel. 
2. Whether it is arbitrary and capricious for an 
Administrative Law Judge to order the payment of medical 
expenses relating to a back condition the applicant claimed was 
not in issue at the hearing. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Rule 1.2.18(A)(1) (b) of the Workersf Compensation 
Rules and Regulations Procedure Effective March 4, 1986 is 
determinative of the first issue presented in this case. A 
copy of the complete Rule is provided as an Addendum. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is an appeal from a decision of the 
Industrial Commission affirming the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order of the Administrative Law Judge. 
The Order of the Administrative Law Judge awarded temporary 
total disability benefits to the respondent without referral to 
a medical panel, despite a clear conflict of medical testimony 
in excess of 120 days. The order also required the appellants 
to pay all of the medical expenses incurred by the respondent 
as a result of the industrial accident, including expenses 
incurred by the respondent for treatment of low back pain. 
However, the low back pain was a pre-existing condition which 
the respondent admitted was not in issue at the hearing. 
Further, there is no medical evidence to suggest the 
respondent's pre-existing low back condition was aggravated 
by the industrial accident. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about July 18, 1985, a box of glass-pack 
vegetables weighing approximately 25 pounds fell from an 
upper shelf striking the respondent on his neck and right 
shoulder, causing him to experience immediate pain in his neck 
and shoulder area. (R. at 28.) 
2. Shortly thereafter, respondent reported to the 
emergency room of Pioneer Valley Hospital where x-rays of his 
neck and upper and lower back were taken. (R. at 29, 30.) 
- 2 -
3. After examining the respondent, the emergency 
room physician released him without prescribing any treatment 
or medication other than three or four days of bed rest. (R. 
at 30.) 
4. Two days later, the applicant traveled to Idaho 
to play in a golf tournament. During the course of play he 
experienced pain while swinging his clubs and reported that the 
following day he was sore in both his shoulder and upper back. 
(R. at 31, 32.) 
5. Respondent sought a second opinion about his 
condition from Dr. John Rock when his soreness continued. (R. 
at 33.) 
6. Dr. Rock examined respondent and subsequently 
prescribed anti-inflammatories and a muscle relaxant. When 
respondent did not seem to improve with this treatment, he 
suggested respondent see a specialist. (R. at 34, 35.) 
7. Respondent then went to see Dr. Michael 
Callahan. Dr. Callahan has acted as his treating physician 
ever since. (R. at 36.) 
8. On September 30, 1985, Dr. Callahan released 
the respondent for light duty work. (R. at 38, 56.) He did not 
indicate at that time whether the respondent had reached a 
point of medical stability with regard to the injuries he 
sustained on July 18, 1985. 
9. In order to determine whether respondent was 
medically stable, appellants requested that he see Dr. Dennis 
Thoen for an independent medical examination. After examining 
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the respondent, Dr. Thoen stated that, as of the date of the 
examination, October 30, 1985, respondent was medically 
stable. (R. at 70.) 
10. Prior to his industrial accident, respondent 
experienced low back pain for approximately one year. (R. at 
42.) 
11. A bone scan performed at the request of 
respondent's treating physician revealed some evidence of 
lumbosacral scoliosis. (R. at 43, 54.) 
12. The respondent returned to full time employment 
on or about March 1, 1986. He has not received an impairment 
rating of any type. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Industrial Commission promulgated guidelines for 
the use of medical panels which became effective March 4, 
1986. According to those guidelines, a medical panel shall be 
used when there are conflicting medical opinions as to the date 
of medical stabilization which vary more than ninety days. In 
the instant case, the hearing was held on the 20th day of 
March, 1986, some sixteen days after the Commission's rules and 
regulations had gone into effect. The Administrative Law Judge 
failed to submit this case to a medical panel even though there 
was conflicting medical evidence meeting the requirements of 
the rule. Therefore, the failure of the Administrative Law 
Judge to follow the rules and guidelines of the Industrial 
Commission constitutes reversible error. Furthermore, the 
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Administrative Law Judge erred when he ordered the appellants 
to pay all of the plaintiff's medical expenses incurred as a 
result of the industrial accident for the evidence reveals that 
some of the medical expenses incurred by the respondent are 
related to problems associated with his low back, a 
pre-existing condition for which the applicant made no 
claim. 
ARGUMENT 
I. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND THEIR OFFICERS ARE 
REQUIRED TO ADHERE TO THE RULES AND REGULATIONS 
PROMULGATED BY THE AGENCY. 
Utah Code Annotated, §35-1-77 (1986 Cumulative 
Supplement) indicates that where an employer or insurance 
carrier denies liability for workers compensation benefits "the 
Commission may refer the medical aspects of the case to a 
medical panel appointed by the Commission. . . . " Subsequent 
to the enactment of §35-1-77 and pursuant to the authority 
granted to it by the Utah State Legislature under U.C.A., 
§35-1-10 (1953 as amended),1 the Commission adopted 
guidelines as an aid in determining when a case should be 
-••Subject to the provisions of this title, the 
commission shall adopt and publish rules and regulations 
governing procedure before it, and shall prescribe forms of 
notices and the manner of serving the same in all claims for 
compensation, and may change the same from time to time in its 
discretion. Such rules and regulations shall include 
provisions for procedures in the nature of conferences in order 
to dispose of cases informally, or to expedite claims 
adjudication, narrow issues and simplify the methods of proof 
at hearings. 
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submitted to a medical panel. The rule promulgated, Rule 
1.2.18 states in part: 
GUIDELINES FOR UTILIZATION OF MEDICAL PANEL -
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the 
Commission adopts the following guidelines in 
determining the necessity of submitting a case to a 
medical panel: 
A. A panel will be utilized where: 
1. One or more significant medical issues are 
involved. Generally, a significant medical 
issue must be shown by conflicting 
medical reports. Significant medical 
issues are involved when there are: 
a. conflicting medical reports of 
permanent physical impairment which 
vary more than 5% of the whole person; 
or 
b. conflicting medical opinions as to the 
temporary total cut-off date which 
vary more than ninety days; or 
c. medical expenses in controversy 
amounting to more than $2,000. 
* * * 
It has long been recognized that the rules and 
regulations promulgated and adopted by an administrative agency 
pursuant to statutory authority have the same force and effect 
as law. It is also generally recognized that once rules have 
been adopted, they bind the agency promulgating them and its 
officers and employees together with all other persons affected 
thereby. See Taylor v. McSwain, 95 P.2d 415, 422 
(Ariz. 1939); Coleman v. City of Gary, 44 N.E.2d 101, 
107 (Ind. 1942); State v. Johnson, 65 N.W.2d 668, 672 
(Minn. 1954); and United States v. RCA Alaska 
Communications, Inc., 597 P.2d 489, 498 (Alaska. 1978). 
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Furthermore, when an administrative agency does not follow its 
own rules and regulations, any order rendered is unlawful and 
void. This result is exemplified by the findings of the 
Supreme Court of Kansas in Tew v. City of Topeka Police and 
Fire Civil Service Commission, 237 Kan. 96, 697 P.2d 1279 
(1985). In Tew, the plaintiff was an unsuccessful 
applicant with the City of Topeka Fire Department. After 
taking and passing the civil service examination, he was 
interviewed by the Commission. Following his interview, Tew 
received a letter from the Commission informing him that he did 
not qualify as an acceptable candidate for appointment to the 
department. He thereafter requested the Commission to provide 
him with a statement of the reasons underlying his rejection, 
but the Commission refused to comply with his request. After 
the trial court granted Tew a Writ of Mandamus requiring 
the Commission to provide him with the requested information, 
the latter appealed. In its decision, the Kansas Supreme Court 
first found that the Commission was authorized by law to adopt 
rules for governing its activities and procedures. It then 
noted that one of the rules which had been adopted by the 
Commission required the cause of rejection of any applicant to 
be identified and placed in the applicants file. This 
information was to be kept confidential except that the 
applicant was to be permitted to see the written statement of 
rejection upon request. The Court then stated: 
There are certain well-established principles 
which govern the application of an administrative 
agency's rules and regulations. The rules and 
regulations adopted by an administrative board to 
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carry out the policy declared by the legislature in 
the statutes have the force and effect of laws. 
Agency regulations are issued for the benefit of 
both the agency and the public, and an agency 
must be held to the terms of its regulations. As a 
general rule an administrative agency may not 
violate or ignore its own rules, and where it fails 
to follow the rules which it has promulgated its 
orders are unlawful. (Citations omitted). 
(Emphasis in original). 
Id. at 1282. It thereafter sustained the lower Court's 
ruling requiring the Commission to comply with the rule it had 
promulgated. See also Amerine v. Board of County 
Commissioners, Etc., 7 Kan.App.2d 491, 644 P.2d 477 (1982). 
The general rules identified above are also 
recognized by this Court as evidenced by the decision rendered 
in State, Etc. v. Utah Merit System Council, 614 P.2d 1259 
(Utah 1980). Therein, the director of the Housing Development 
Agency, which agency was a party to certain administrative 
proceedings, was excluded from a portion of the hearing held in 
the matter. This action was found to constitute reversible 
error. The Court pointed out that the Merit System Council had 
previously adopted merit system procedural rules which provided 
for the questioning of adverse party witnesses by other 
interested parties. The agency director in question was found 
to be an interested party who was entitled to be present and 
propose questions as provided under the rule. In finding 
reversible error the Court stated: 
No agency representative with full knowledge of the 
case was present at the proceedings to propose 
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questions. The Council cannot violate its own 
procedural rules by denying an appropriate agency 
representative access to the proceedings. 
(Citations omitted). 
Id. at 1263. 
In the instant case, the Industrial Commission rule 
at issue uses mandatory language: H[a] panel will be utilized 
where:". The mandatory nature of this language removes all 
discretion otherwise afforded to the Administrative Law Judge 
for purposes of submitting medical conflicts to a panel if the 
evidence adduced at the hearing falls within one or more of the 
specific parameters thereafter set forth. It thus creates a 
right upon which all parties to the action are entitled to rely 
so long as the rule is in effect and the parameters of the rule 
are met. In the instant case, the evidence adduced at the 
administrative hearing meets the parameters outlined in 
subsection A(l)(b) of Rule 1.2.18: 
Conflicting medical opinions as to the temporary 
total cut-off date which vary more than ninety 
days . . . 
The report of Dr. Dennis Thoen, an eminently 
qualified neurologist, stated that the respondent was medically 
stable with regard to the effects of his industrial injury as 
of October 30, 1985. On the other hand, Dr. Michael 
Callahan, respondent's treating physician, made no specific 
findings with regard to the date on which respondent became 
medically stable. Dr. Callahan did release respondent for 
light duty work on September 30, 1985; however, respondent did 
not actually return to work until March 1, 1986. The order of 
the Administrative Law Judge required the appellants to pay 
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temporary total disability benefits to the respondent through 
February 28, 1986, the day before respondent returned to full 
time employment. It is apparent that the Administrative Law 
Judge interpreted Dr. Callahan's failure to make a specific 
finding on the period of temporary total disability as an 
indication that the applicant was not medically stable until 
the date he returned to full-time employment. The difference 
between the date Dr. Thoen found the respondent to be 
medically stable and the date through which the Administrative 
Law Judge ordered the appellants to pay temporary total 
disability benefits is a period of four months or approximately 
120 days. Thus, there exists a significant medical issue as 
defined under Rule 1.2.18 (A)(1)(b), and the appellants are 
entitled to have the issue submitted to a medical panel. The 
failure of the judge to follow the above-cited rule clearly 
prejudiced the rights of the appellants for it deprived them of 
the opportunity to have an independent body assess the 
respondent's injury and provide additional evidence to be 
considered by the Administrative Law Judge in resolving the 
conflict surrounding the respondent's disability period. 
It may be contended by the respondent that the 
Commission's characterization of the provisions outlined in 
Rule 1.2.18 as "guidelines" defeats appellants' contention that 
the rule is mandatory and binding upon the Administrative Law 
Judge. In Utah Merit System Council the defendants posed 
this same argument, but the Court found it to be unconvincing 
and stated: 
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Defendants contend that the procedural 
rules are merely 'guidelines,' but 
administrative regulations are presumed to 
be reasonable and valid and cannot be 
ignored or followed by the agency to suit 
its own purposes. Such is the essence of 
arbitrary and capricious action. Without 
compelling grounds for not following its 
rules, an agency must be held to them. 
(Citations omitted). 
Id. at 1263. In the instant case there is no evidence of 
compelling grounds which would justify the Administrative Law 
Judge's failure to follow Rule 1.2.18. Furthermore, the 
absolute nature of the "guidelines" promulgated by the 
Commission in the instant case is made clear by the mandatory 
language used by the Commission in the body of the rule. In 
stating that a medical panel "will be utilized where," the 
Commission has made it clear that, in the circumstances 
outlined, referral to a medical panel is not discretionary. 
Because the Administrative Law Judge did not submit 
the issue of temporary total disability to a medical panel as 
required by Rule 1.2.18(A)(1)(b), and because rules and 
regulations properly promulgated by the Commission pursuant to 
its statutory authority have the force and effect of law and 
are binding on the Administrative Law Judge as an officer of 
the Commission, it is requested that the order of the 
Administrative Law Judge entered January 25, 1986, be vacated 
and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with 
the Rule. 
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II. BECAUSE THE APPLICANT MADE NO CLAIM FOR A 
LOW BACK INJURY, AND BECAUSE THERE WAS NO MEDICAL 
EVIDENCE LINKING THE APPLICANT'S LONG-STANDING LOW 
BACK PAIN TO THE INDUSTRIAL INJURY, THE ALJ'S 
ORDER AWARDING MEDICAL EXPENSES ASSOCIATED WITH THE 
APPLICANT'S LOW BACK PAIN WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS. 
In Moyes on behalf of Moyes v. State, 699 P.2d 
748, 751 (Utah 1985), this Court stated: 
In reviewing findings by the Commission, 
our general inquiry is whether the findings 
are arbitrary or capricious - i.e., wholly 
without cause, contrary to the one 
inevitable conclusion from the evidence or 
without any evidence to support them. 
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, Utah, 
631 P.2d 888, 890 (1981). (Emphasis added.) 
In the instant case, there is no evidence supporting the 
Administrative Law Judge's award of medical payments for 
medical expenses associated with treatment of the respondent's 
low back. Thus, that portion of the award was arbitrary and 
capricious and should not be sustained. 
As indicated in the Statement of Facts, the accident 
at issue occurred when a box of glass-pack vegetables fell 
from a shelf and struck the respondent. When asked where the 
box hit him, the respondent stated: "It struck me on my upper 
back and right shoulder and neck area." (R. at 28.) At no 
point during the direct examination of the respondent did he 
ever indicate having any problems with his low back as a result 
of the industrial accident of July 1985. The only symptoms he 
reported having were limited to his neck and shoulder area. 
For example, upon direct questioning by the Administrative Law 
Judge about the pain he experienced after the accident the 
respondent replied as follows: 
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Then I had extreme pain in my neck, and 
some in the shoulder area. But mostly 
it was in the upper neck. And I had a very 
bad headache. And the next morning when I 
woke up I had you know, really extreme pain 
in the shoulder area. And not as much in 
the neck. 
(R. at 28.) See also Record on Appeal, pg. 29, lines 
12-13; pg. 32, line 22. Later, during cross-examination, 
respondent was questioned about his prior history of low back 
pain as reflected in the medical records of Dr. Callahan. 
Respondent replied that he had first started experiencing low 
back pain around the middle of August 1984, almost a full year 
prior to the industrial accident. (R. at 42.) The 
respondent indicated his low back pain occurred whenever he 
drove or sat for long periods of time in one place. He then 
volunteered: "The lower back is not in question here, I do not 
feel. It's nothing—". (R. at 42.) (Emphasis supplied). 
Thus, by the respondent's own testimony, his lower back was not 
an issue in the case. When an applicant is not seeking 
compensation for a particular injury, the hearing officer 
cannot arbitrarily award benefits for that injury on his own 
accord. This fact is illustrated by the decision in Dow 
Chemical Company v. Industrial Comm'n., 22 Utah 2d 403, 454 
P.2d 286 (1969). In Dow, the applicant made a claim for 
injuries suffered in a 1967 accident. The Commission denied 
benefits for the accident on grounds the applicant was a sole 
proprietor at the time of its occurrence and thus, he was not 
entitled to benefits from his alleged employer. However, the 
Commission then proceeded to award additional temporary total 
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disability benefits to the applicant for injuries sustained in 
another industrial accident which had occurred several years 
earlier. The Utah Supreme Court reversed the Commission and 
stated: 
Under the state of the record and the 
findings, we apprehend and hold that the 
contention of Dow Chemical that the 
Commission erred in ordering that it pay 
compensation •for all periods of temporary 
total disability subsequent to November 21, 
1964, and prior to March 11, 1967, as 
certified by his treating physician as 
being attributable to the accident of 
November 21, 1964' is well taken since (1) 
Swaner made no claim therefor . . . . 
(Emphasis in original.) 
Id. at 287. In the case at bar, the applicant stated at the 
hearing that his lower back was not an issue. Thus, the 
Administrative Law Judge should not have awarded medical 
payments for treatment of the lower back. 
In addition to Mr. Tolman's own testimony that his 
low back problems are not related to his industrial injury, the 
medical records do not establish any causal connection between 
the two. As previously mentioned, Dr. Callahan's records 
show that the respondent reported a history of low back pain 
dating approximately a year prior to the accident at issue 
herein. (R. at 67.) Furthermore, the results of the bone scan 
appearing on page 54 of the Record on Appeal indicate that the 
respondent suffers from lumbosacral scoliosis, a problem 
most likely the source of the intermittent low back pain 
experienced by the respondent. 
Dr. Dennis Thoen also examined the respondent for 
the purpose of an independent medical examination. His report 
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indicates that the respondent, until just recently, had always 
been ashamed of his height, six feet five inches, and that he 
"always walked with a slump and a bend in his low back." (R. 
at 69.) Dr. Thoen also noted in his report that the 
respondent "normally sits with his buttock at the very end of a 
chair, his shoulder touching the back rest with a severe 
posterior bowing of the low back. When he stood against the 
edge of the examining table, he also assumed this position. It 
was almost a lumbar 'kyphosis'." Dr. Thoen pointed this 
poor posture position out to the respondent and asked him why 
he didn't sit straight, and the respondent "then sat up as 
straight as he could but obviously had to strain to maintain 
this position. He [the respondent] then stated 'I don't 
normally sit this way but I guess I should.'" Dr. Thoen 
suggested that the respondent's low back problems might be the 
result of the poor posture the respondent has assumed since his 
youth. 
In view of the respondent's own testimony about the 
industrial accident itself and the symptoms he experienced 
thereafter, and in view of the failure of the medical records 
to establish any causal connection between the accident and the 
respondent's low back pain, it is respectfully requested that 
that portion of the Administrative Law Judge's order awarding 
medical expenses for treatment of the respondent's low back be 
vacated and set aside. 
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CONCLUSION 
The rules and regulations properly promulgated by 
an administrative agency pursuant to statutory authority have 
the same force and effect as law and are binding on both the 
public and the officers and employees of the agency 
promulgating them. Furthermore, any action taken in violation 
of those rules and regulations is unlawful and void. In the 
instant case, the Administrative Law Judge failed to follow the 
rules and regulations of the Industrial Commission requiring 
submission of "significant medical issues" to a medical panel. 
The failure to refer this matter to a medical panel as required 
deprived the appellants of the right to receive an impartial 
medical resolution of a medical conflict. Thus, the order of 
the Administrative Law Judge regarding the period of temporary 
total disability cannot stand and the matter must be remanded 
for proceedings consistent with the rule. 
Finally, in the instant case the applicant did not 
establish any causal connection between his low back problems 
and the industrial injury of July 18, 1985, nor was any claimed 
by the applicant. For this reason, that portion of the 
Administrative Law Judge's order requiring the appellants to 
pay the medical expenses associated with the respondent's low 
back problems should be reversed. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3/ day of July, 1986. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
- 17 -
ADDENDUM 
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VJorkors* Compensation Hitler & Regulations 
disputes . 
18. GUIDELINES FOR UTILIZATION OF MEDICAL 
PANEL - Pursuant to Section 35 1-77, 
U.C.A., the Commission adopts the fol 
lowing guidelines in determining the 
necessity of submitting a case to a 
medical panel: 
A. A panel will be utilized where: 
1. One or more significant med-
ical issues are involved. 
Generally a significant med-
ical issue must be shown by 
conflicting medical reports. 
Significant medical issues 
are involved when there are: 
a. conflicting medical re-
ports of permanent phys-
ical impairment which 
vary more than 57c of the 
whole person; or 
b. conflicting medical opin-
ions as to the temporary 
total cutoff date which 
vary more than 90 days; 
or 
c. medical expenses in con-
troversy amounting to 
more than $2,000. 
2. In the opinion of the Com-
mission, the medical issues 
are so intertwined with the 
events that a determination 
of whether an accident has 
occurred cannot be made with-
25 
Workers* Compensation Rviles & Regulations 
out first resolving medical 
consideration. 
B. Where, in the opinion of the 
Commission, the evidence is insuf-
ficient for the Commission to make 
a final determination, the Commis-
sion may require an independent 
medical evaluation, costs to be 
assessed against the employer 
and/or Second Injury Fund. 
C. A hearing on objections to the 
panel report may be scheduled if 
there is a proffer of conflicting 
medical testimony or evidence 
showing a need to clarify the 
medical panel report. 
D. The Commission may authorize an 
injured worker to be examined by 
another physician for the purpose 
of obtaining a further medical 
examination or evaluation pertain-
ing to the medical issues involved, 
and to obtain a report addressing 
these medical issues in all cases 
where: 
1. The treating physician has 
failed or refused to give an 
impairment rating. 
2. The employer or doctor 
considers the claim to be 
non-industrial. 
3. A substantial injustice may 
occur without such further 
evaluation. 
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